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RECENT DECISIONS
APPEAL AND ERROR-MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION
PROCEEDINGS-SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW.
Appeal of the Township of Plum (Pa. 1955).
In an annexation proceeding under "The General Borough Act" 1 The
Borough of Oakmont, by ordinance, annexed an adjacent portion of a
second class township pursuant to a petition by the majority of freeholders
in the annexed territory. The Court of Quarter Sessions of Allegheny
County held that the borough ordinance was valid. The township appealed.
The Superior Court in a 4-3 decision held that where a statute provides
that court determination of the legality of ordinances shall be conclusive, 2
appellate review is narrowly limited to questions of jurisdiction and of
regularity and broad certiorari could not be granted. The court found that
the lower court had jurisdiction and the proceedings were regular. Appeal
of Township of Plum, 116 A.2d 260 (Pa. 1955).'
Traditionally the scope of the writ of certiorari was limited to a review
of the jurisdiction of the lower court and the regularity of the proceedings.4
However, there has been a gradual tendency to expand the scope of review
on certiorari. In Pennsylvania this expansion has given rise to a distinction
between a narrow and broad certiorari. 5 While the tendency to allow broad
certiorari appears to have had its inception in a series of election cases 6
it has been extended to cover other situations.7  Narrow certiorari is
similar to the traditional limited certiorari while broad certiorari includes
an examination of the record, which, by statute,8 includes testimony taken
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§ 12461, 12462 (Supp. 1954).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12900 (Supp. 1954).
3. Appeal of the Township of Plum, 116 A.2d 260 (Pa. 1955).
4. In re License to Carlson, 127 Pa. 330, 18 Atl. 8 (1889) ; Holland v. White,
120 Pa. 228, 13 Atl. 782 (1888).
5. East Side Democratic Club License Liquor Case, 160 Pa. Super. 36, 50 A.2d 514
(1947) ; Blair Liquor License Case, 158 Pa. Super. 365, 45 A.2d 421 (1946) ; Market
Street National Bank of Shamokin v. Coal Township, 156 Pa. Super. 182, 39 A.2d 744
(1944) ; Askounes Liquor License Case, 144 Pa. Super. 293, 19 A.2d 846 (1941).
6. Krickbaums Contested Election, 221 Pa. 521, 70 Atl. 852 (1908) ; Independence
Party Nomination, 208 Pa. 108, 57 Atl. 344 (1904) ; Nomination Certificate of John
S. Robb, Sr., 188 Pa. 212, 41 Atl. 477 (1898).
7. Commonwealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469, 9 A.2d 408 (1939) (conviction for
driving in excess of speed limit) ; Mami's Liquor License Case, 144 Pa. Super.
285, 19 A.2d 549 (1941) (revocation of liquor license for the purchase of unlicensed
liquor).
8. "In any proceeding heretofore or hereafter had in any court of record of this
Commonwealth where the testimony has been or shall be taken by witnesses,
depositions, or otherwise, and where an appeal has been or shall hereafter be taken
from the order, sentence, decree, or judgment, entered in said proceedings, to the
(162)
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from witnesses or by deposition. The superior court in Katifman Const.
Co. v. Holcomb," recognized a distinction between the scope of certiorari
under a statute which merely fails to provide for a right of appeal and
under a statute which expressly denies an appeal. Where a statute merely
fails to provide for an appeal certiorari may be granted in the broad sense.' 0
If the statute expressly denies an appeal then review beyond determining
questions of jurisdiction and regularity of proceedings is prohibited.' The
real problem in this area is illustrated vividly in the principal case when
the majority and minority of the court differ as to whether the statute
expressly denies an appeal by use of the words, "The determination and
order of the court thereon shall be conclusive. In cases of ordinances effect-
ing annexation of territory or laying out streets over private lands, the court
shall have jurisdiction to review the propriety as well as the legality of the
ordinance." 12 The majority construe these words as constituting an ex-
press denial of the right of appeal and thus limit themselves to a review
of questions of jurisdiction and regularity of the proceedings below. The
minority rejects this interpretation and cites many superior court cases in
which broad certiorari was granted on an appeal in an annexation pro-
ceeding.' 3
It is interesting to note that the court states, "A thorough examination
of the entire record convinces us that there was ample evidence to justify
the lower court's action and we find no abuse of discretion." 14 Thus the
court while purporting to restrict itself to a narrow certiorari, does in fact
examine the "entire record" and says that even if the examination were
through a broad certiorari they would affirm the findings of the lower court.
Conceding the possible use of this technique as a means of preventing fur-
ther appellate procedure, it is also apparently an indication of the uncer-
Superior or Supreme Court, such testimony shall be filed in said proceedings, and
the effect of said appeal shall be to remove, for the consideration of the appellate
court, the testimony taken in the court from which the appeal is taken, and the same
shall be reviewed by the appellate court as a part of the record, with like effect as
upon an appeal from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in an action at
law, and the appeal so taken shall not have the effect only of a certiorari to review
the regulartiy of the proceedings in the court below." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12
§ 1165 (Supp. 1954).
9. 357 Pa. 514, 55 A.2d 534 (1947).
10. Commonwealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469, 9 A.2d 408 (1939); Grime v. Dept.
of Public Instruction, 324 Pa. 371, 188 At. 337 (1936) ; Warner Bros. Theatres,
Inc. v. Pottstown Borough, 164 Pa. Super. 91, 63 A.2d.101 (1949).
11. First Baptist Church v. Pittsburgh, 341 Pa. 568, 20 A.2d 209 (1941) ; State
Board of Undertakers v. Joseph T. Sekula Funeral Home, Inc., 339 Pa. 309, 14
A.2d 308 (1940); Saxony Construction Co. Appeal, 178 Pa. Super. 132, 113 A.2d
342 (1955) ; Kimnmell Liquor License Case, 157 Pa. Super. 59, 41 A.2d 436 (1945).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 § 12900 (Supp. 1954).
13. Lemoyne Borough Annexation Case, 176 Pa. Super. 38, 107 A.2d 149
(1954); Salisbury Township Annexation Case, 172 Pa. Super. 262, 94 A.2d 143
(1953); Ontelaunee Township Annexation Case, 172 Pa. Super. 71, 92 A.2d 262
(1952) ; Dallas Borough Annexation Case, 169 Pa. Super. 129, 82 A.2d 676 (1951);
Irwin Borough Annexation Case (No. 1), 165 Pa. Super. 119, 67 A.2d 757 (1949)
In re Appeal of Bender from Ordinance of Borough of Akron, 106 Pa. Super. 376,
163 Ati. 47 (1932).
14. Appeal of the Township of Plum, 116 A.2d 260, 263 (Pa. 1955).
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tainty of the court's position. It seems incongruous for a court to so readily
submit its power of appellate review to the equivocal language of this stat-
ute in view of the general reluctance of the judiciary to surrender such
powers. Perhaps, however, there is no genuine reluctance on the part of
the courts to forego the power of review in cases such as this. In fact,
courts may be only too willing to avoid the onerous review of the numerous
cases involving appeals from administrative boards. The right of appeal
is precious to every litigant. It is the duty of the courts to preserve this
right and to surrender it only in the face of clear and unequivocal statutory
language.
Francis R. O'Hara
CONFLICT OF LAWS-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-
CONFLICTING STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS.
Carroll v. Lanza (U. S. 1955).
The Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act provides that the remedy
given by the act is exclusive.' Plaintiff, a Missouri resident, was working
in Arkansas for a subcontractor under a Missouri employment contract.
He was injured while fulfilling the subcontractor's obligation to the defend-
ant, the general contractor. Immediate payment was made by the sub-
contractor under the Missouri statute for a period of thirty-four weeks.
While receiving these payments, plaintiff sued defendant for common-law
damages in the Arkansas courts. Defendant had the case removed to the
Federal District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, where judg-
ment was rendered for the plaintiff.2 On appeal to the Circuit Court for
the Eighth Circuit, judgment was reversed 3 on the basis that the full faith
and credit clause of the Federal Constitution 4 prohibited recovery. The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and reversed the
court of appeals on the grounds that in personal injury cases, the state of
the forum and locus of the tort has an interest to serve and protect, and its
courts need not recognize the exclusive remedy of the state of domicile.
Carroll v. Lanza, 75 Sup. Ct. 804 (1955). 5
This case is principally concerned with the provisions of the various
workmen's compensation acts as applied to the exclusiveness of the remedy. 6
1. This chapter shall apply to all injuries received in this state, regardless of
where the contract of employment was made, and also to all injuries received outside
of this state under contract of employment made in this state, unless the contract
of employment in any case shall otherwise provide. Mo. ANN. STAT. §287.110
(Vernon 1954).
2. 116 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
3. 216 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1954).
4. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
5. Carroll v. Lanza, 75 Sup. Ct. 804 (1955).
6. For example, in Tennessee the act states, "Rights and remedies herein granted
to an employee subject to this chapter on account of personal injury or death by
[VoL. 1.
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Workmen's compensation acts are public acts within the meaning of the
full faith and credit clause. 7 They must be given effect by the forum of a
sister state when they provide exclusive remedies.8 It is true also that they
should be liberally construed in furtherance of the purpose for which they
were enacted. 9 A balance has been struck among the interests of the several
states in granting awards under their respective statutes, whereby a limiting
interpretation has been given to the scope of the full faith and credit
clause. 10 Some rational basis must be shown for holding a conflicting stat-
ute superior to the law of the forum." This rational basis is readily found
in cases involving support orders 12 or the possibility of injustice to the
injured party.1" Although a state need not contravene its own public policy
to enforce conflicting statutes of another state, 14 nevertheless, public policy
cannot be extended so far as to cause the full faith and credit clause to lose
accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal
representative, dependents or next of kin, at common-law or otherwise, on account
of such injury or death." TENN. CODE §§ 6859, 6870 (1932). However, as con-
strued by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, this statute does not preclude recovery
under the laws of another state, whereas the Missouri act applies "to all injuries
received in this state, regardless of where the contract of employment was made,
and also to all injuries received outside of the state under contract of employment
made in this state, unless the contract of employment in any case shall otherwise
provide." Missouri, then, bars a common-law action by the employee of a subcon-
tractor against a prime contractor when the Missouri act is applicable. New
Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Boaz Kiel Construction Co., 115 F.2d 950 (8th Cir.
1940); Bunner v. Pattie, 343 Mo. 274, 121 S.W.2d 153 (1938). The Arkansas act
provides that the making of a claim "shall not affect the rights of an employee or
his dependents to make claim or maintain an action in tort against any third party
for such injury." Baldwin Co. v. Maner, 273 S.W.2d 28 (Ark. 1954).
7. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
8. Ibid. (New Hampshire, which gave the option of suing at common-law was
required to give effect to the Vermont act which was the exclusive remedy. Dictum
in that case suggests, however, that there is room for some play of conflicting
policies of the acts.); Accord, John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299
U.S. 178 (1936).
9. Baltimore and Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408 (1932).
10. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm. of Cal., 306 U.S.
493 (1939) ; Alaskan Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm. of Cal., 294 U.S.
532 (1935) ("the conflict is to be resolved, not by giving automatic effect to the
Full Faith and Credit clause, compelling the courts of each state to subordinate its
own statutes to those of the other, but by appraising the governmental interest of
each jurisdiction and turning the scale of decision according to their weight.");
Accord, Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948) ("The Full Faith and Credit clause is
not to be applied, accordian-like to accomodate our personal predilections.") ; Pink
v. A.A.A. Highway Express, 314 U.S. 343 (1941). Contra, Sherrer v. Sherrer,
334 U.S. 343 (1948) ("The Full Faith and Credit clause is one of the provisions
incorporated into the Constitution by its framers for the purpose of transforming an
aggregation of independent sovereign states into a nation, and, if in its application,
local policy must at times be required to give way, the result is part of the price
of our federal system.").
11. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
12. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
13. Alaskan Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm. of Cal., 294 U.S. 532(1935).
14. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm. of Cal., 306 U.S.
493 (1939).
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its effectiveness.15  A more concrete answer to the problem was suggested
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Magnolia Petro-
leum Co. v. Hunt 16 where it was held that if a compensation award is res
judicata in one state, the claimant is precluded from recovery in a foreign
state. This decision has been limited on several occasions. For example,
an employee received two awards in a case in which he reserved in his first
settlement contract the right to seek recovery in the forum notwithstanding
the fact that the first award was res judicata. 17 Moreover, the federal courts
have asserted jurisdiction to rule on the sufficiency of the grounds for the
denial of full faith and credit.' s It has also been noted that neither the con-
stitutional provision 19 nor the act of Congress implementing it 2o' say any-
thing with respect to the need of a final judgment. 21 The Supreme Court
of the United States has declared in a more recent case that a state's inter-
est in the welfare of its citizens will be a factor in determining jurisdiction
where two conflicting statutes are involved. 2
It appears the Court in the present case has further advanced the
proposition that particular interests of each state will be weighed in reach-
ing an amicable solution where two state statutes are in conflict. However,
in this case there is an evident difference from the majority of its pred-
ecessors. In other cases where valid state interests were recognized, those
interests seem to have been ascertained from the facts of each particular
case. In this case the interests of Arkansas, the state of the forum, do not
seem to be of paramount importance. Missouri is the state to be burdened
if one of its citizens should become a public charge due to inadequate work-
men's compensation. True the state where the tort occurs has interests
to serve and protect. The problems of medical care and dependents usually
follow in the wake of the injury. But in this case all the medical care had
been undertaken in Missouri, and there is nothing to indicate the presence
of any dependents in Arkansas. Hence, the only connection with Arkansas
is the forum and the locus of the injury. Though they are important con-
nections they have not been deemed sufficient, in and of themselves, in the
past to outweigh the considerations of full faith and credit. It seems, there-
fore, that the Supreme Court intends to extend the scope of the valid
interest doctrine, at least in workmen's compensation cases.
James A. Matthews, Jr.
15. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
16. 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
17. Industrial Comm. of Wis. v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947) (Illinois
payments said to be, in legal effect, a final award.).
18. Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944).
19. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
20. 1 STAT. 122 (1790) (later amended by 62 STAT. 947 (1948), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (1952)).
21. Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 87 (1944) (concurring opinion).
22. Cardille v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947) (Court asserted
the interest of the District of Columbia in an injury which occured in Virginia).
[VOL. 1.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EMINENT DOMAIN-JUST COMPENSATION
-PROSPECTIVE POWER USE.
United States v. Twin City Power Co. (5th Cir. 1955).
Twin City had acquired and held land as a prospective power site.
The land borders on a stream upon which navigation has been eliminated
by a solid dam, and a power house has been built by the government in
order to devote the entire flow of the Savannah River to the production of
hydroelectric power. The federal government condemned the lands for
use as a government-owned power site. It was held, that in the light of
these facts, the compensation figure should include the power potential
of the site involved. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 221 F.2d 299
(5th Cir. 1955).1
While just compensation is based on the value of the property at the
time of the requisition, 2 the Constitution contains no definite rules or
standards indicating when compensation is to be given and in what
amounts.3 Just compensation includes all elements of value, and the high-
est and most profitable use for which the land is adaptable. The fact that
the most valuable use can only be made in combination with other lands
does not exclude that use from consideration, if such combination is prob-
able.4 The right to compensation in eminent domain proceedings, is found
in the fifth amendment. In addition, this right rests on equitable prin-
ciples and attempts to put the owner in as good a position financially as he
would be if his property were not taken.5 The existing or immediately
expected business wants of the community are a standard of fair market
value.6 This includes situations in which an owner of land could reasonably
be expected to make use of the peculiar adaptability of the land by de-
veloping it in a manner similar to that intended by the condemning agency. 7
However, the situation differs when the property borders on a navigable
stream. Title to such land is held subject to the public easement for pur-
poses of navigation.8 In the case of United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co.9
a power company, under a revocable permit from the Secretary of War,
had built dams, dykes and forebays along the sides of the St. Mary's River
in order to create power for commercial purposes. The federal government
1. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 221 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1955), Petition
for certiorari filed July 6, 1955, by the Solicitor General on question is landowner
entitled to receive, as an element of just compensation, special increment based
upon land's adaptability to use as site for hydroelectric power operation, 24 U.S.L.
WEEK 3029 (U.S. July 19, 1955) No. 209).
2. Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341 (1927).
3. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949) (dictum).
4. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
5. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1942).
6. Boom Company v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878).
7. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
8. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
9. 229 U.S. 53 (1912).
JANUARY 1956]
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condemned the land in order to improve the waterway for navigation pur-
poses, and also to utilize the power potential of the river. The Supreme
Court held that water power rights are not private property, and, hence,
compensation was not required for the removal of the development works
which were in the river since they were there by sufferance. The court
made it clear that in taking the land bordering on the river the government
did not take the water power which potentially existed in the river since
that was always held subject to the superior right of the public under the
commerce clause.' Chief Judge Hutcheson, in the Twin City case, dis-
tinguishes the Dunbar case on the ground that the taking here was not for
purposes of navigation since the dam blocked such a use, and that the real
purpose was for the erection of power plants." However, the commerce
clause has been given the broadest possible definition, 12 and as a result the
powers flowing from this direct grant have become so numerous that the
courts today speak of them as if they were virtually direct grants. 13 In
this respect the Supreme Court has said:
"In truth the authority of the United States is the regulation of
commerce on its waters. Navigability, in the sense just stated, is but
a part of this whole. Flood protection, watershed development, re-
covery of the cost of improvements through utilization of power are
likewise parts of commerce control." 14
The fact that navigability is prevented by the presence of a dam is of no
import insofar as the presence of a navigable waterway is concerned. 15
To distinguish the Dunbar case on the ground that in that case the court
dealt only with the "bed" of the river 16 appears rather specious. In con-
10. Id. at 62, 66, 69-72. "The Federal Government has domination over the
water power inherent in the flowing stream. It is liable to no one for its use or non-
use. The flow of a navigable stream is in no sense private property; 'that the
running water in a great navigable stream is capable of private ownership is in-
conceivable.' Exclusion of riparian owners from its benefits without compensation
is entirely within the Government's discretion." United States v. Appalachian Electric
Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 424 (1940).
11. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 221 F.2d 299, 300 (5th Cir. 1955).
12. "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more-it is inter-
course. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations,
in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that inter-
course." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 83 (1824).
13. Courts habitually speak of the powers flowing from the power of congress
over navigation, rather than from the powers under the commerce clause. See
United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950) ; Grand River Dam
Authority v. Grand-Hydro, 335 U.S. 359 (1948) ; United States v. Appalachian
Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940). Compare with Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288 (1936).
14. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940).
15. "When once found to be navigable, a waterway remains so." It does not
lose that character because its use for navigation in interstate commerce has lessened
or ceased. Id. at 408, 409.
16. "This difference is that, in the Chandler-Dunbar case, the United States
took the bed and adjoining fast lands of a navigable stream. ...... " United States
v. Twin City Power Co., 221 F2d 299, 300 (5th Cir. 1955) (Emphasis added).
[VOL. 1.
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stitutional law the high water mark bounds the bed of the river, and the
lands above it are called fast lands.17 In the Dunbar case the court did not
include the value of the power potential in the bed or the fast lands. Hence,
if the value of power rights in lands which are already being used for such
purposes are not included, it seems logical that potential rights in unde-
veloped land can be taken wthout compensation. Consequently, it is diffi-
cult to distinguish the Dunbar case even on a factual basis. The cases cited
by the court in the Twin City case as rejecting the application of the
Dunbar doctrine in this situation fail to bear out that contention.' 8
The circuit courts are split on the matter under consideration.' 9 Since
the refusal to include the power potential is based on the principle that
the owner took with notice of the public easement, it is imperative that the
matter be settled by a final decision. If the courts cannot agree upon the
elements to be included in the compensation figure, the property owner
improves his land at his peril. The problem goes beyond reasonable com-
pensation. Involved is the whole issue of a conservative interpretation of
the commerce clause, as well as the issue of federal power interests as op-
posed to state and private power interests. If the federal government can
control any navigable stream for any power purpose, it follows that the
government can develop all the hydroelectric power output of the country.
The lower federal courts, especially those in the south, 2° include as an
element of compensation the potential use of the land as a power site. This
in turn presents a serious economic obstacle to the construction of govern-
17. United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 805 (1950).
18. In Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro, 335 U.S. 359 (1948), it
was simply held that when an agency of the state exercised the right of condem-
nation granted by the state, the value of the land for use as a power site could be
taken into consideration. But: "If either the United States, or its licensee as such,
were seeking to acquire this land under the Federal Power Act, it might face
different considerations from those stated above. The United States enjoys special
rights and power in relationship to navigable streams and also to streams which affect
interstate commerce. The United States, however, is not a party to the present
case." Id. at 373; in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 736-
739 (1950), it was held that Congress under the Reclamation Act did not intend
to invoke its navigation servitude as to each and every one of this group of co-
ordinated projects and has not attempted to take, or authorized the taking, without
compensation, of rights valid under state law. In United States v. Kansas City
Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950) the court held that by maintaining the water at the
high water mark on a navigable stream, the percolating of water above the high
water mark on a non-navigable tributary is a taking. The court reaffirmed its
position as to damages resulting to private property within the bed of a navigable
stream; and in Federal Power Commission v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347
U.S. 239 (1954), the court stated: "We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that,
even though respondent's water rights are of a kind that is within the scope of the
Government's dominant servitude, the Government (in passing the Federal Water
Power Act of 1920) has not exercised its power to abolish them." Hence, the prob-
lem was not in issue. Id. at 248.
19. Continental Land Co. v. United States, 88 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1937) and
Washington Water Power Co. v. United States, 135 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1943)(No compensation); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 215 F.2d 592 (4th
Cir. 1954), cert. granted, 75 Sup. Ct. 298 (1955).
20. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 215 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1954),
cert. granted, 75 Sup. Ct. 298 (1955) ; United States v. Appalachian Electric Power
Co., 107 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1939), rev'd, 311 U.S. 377 (1940), rehearing denied, 312
U.S. 712 (1941).
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ment-owned facilities. With certiorari having been granted in a similar
case from the fourth circuit, 2 1 the Supreme Court may take this oppor-
tunity to decide the extent to which the federal government's utilization
and control of power, insofar as the obligation to compensate is concerned,
should prevail over private and state interests, thus ending the uncertainty
caused by the conflicting views of the federal courts.
Thomas F. Burns
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-HABEAS CORPUS-
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE.
United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye (3d Cir. 1955).
The accused was charged with first degree murder. At the trial the
defense contended that the accused, as a result of the use of alcohol and
drugs, was in such a mental state that he could not have formulated the
necessary intent for first degree murder, and that in any event, because of
his drunken condition, his offense did not warrant the death penalty. After
the jury found the accused guilty of murder in the first degree, he was
sentenced to death. A petition for habeas corpus was filed in the district
court alleging the withholding and suppressing by the Commonwealth of
vital testimony favorable to the relator. One of the two arresting officers
had informed the prosecutor before trial that the accused had been under
the influence of liquor at the time of his arrest four hours after the killing.
This testimony was not introduced although the other arresting officer was
permitted to testify that the accused was in full possession of his faculties
when arrested. Denial of habeas corpus was reversed by the court of ap-
peals which held that the testimony suppressed was substantial evidence and
should have been submitted to the jury. United States ex rel. Thompson
v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955). 1
An unconstitutional conviction will result if a prosecuting officer with-
holds vital evidence favorable to the defendant; 2 such conduct is viewed as
being fundamentally unfair and, hence, due process 3 is violated. 4  A court
handing down a verdict, judgment, and sentence in violation of constitu-
21. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 215 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1954), cert.
granted, 75 Sup. Ct. 298 (1955).
1. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955).
2. United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 104 F. Supp. 321, 325 (E.D. Pa.
1951), aff'd, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952).
3. United States Supreme Court Justice Harold H. Burton who, incidentally,
on June 18, 1953 denied the accused a stay of execution, has said that: "Due process
has reference to a standard of process that may cover many varieties of processes
that are expressive of differing combinations of historical or modern, local or other
juridical standards, provided they do not conflict with the fundamental principles
of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."
Bute v. People of Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 649 (1948).
4. Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103
(1935) ; United States v. Rutkin, 212 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1954).
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tional rights acts without jurisdiction and thus the entire proceeding is null
and void.5  The prosecutor is a state official," a quasi-judicial officer, 7 and
not a vindictive seeker of vengeance,8 and he may be required not only to
refrain from actively suppressing evidence vital to the accused, 9 but he may
even be compelled to disclose such evidence to the court.10 He is not re-
quired to disclose evidence which has no probative value or is merely cumu-
lative," or evidence which is equally available to the accused.' 2 To deter-
mine whether or not there has been suppression of evidence it is necessary
to consider the facts and circumstances in each case. 13  The instant case is
not lacking in special circumstances. Usually evidence of sobriety or
drunkenness after a crime has been committed is inadmissable,'1 4 but here
testimony was introduced as to the former but withheld as to the latter.
Defense counsel was not aware that an arresting officer if put on the stand
would have stated accused was under the influence of liquor when ar-
rested.' 5 The prosecutor had this knowledge but the officer was not called
to the stand,16 nor was his name indorsed on the indictment.' 7 Indeed, at
the close of a night session, the prosecutor, after presenting testimony as
to the sobriety of the accused, stated in open court that he "could call a few
other police officers who would corroborate what has already been
testified to." 18 However, he refrained from doing so in order to save
time. "Thus the wrong of nondisclosure of obviously significant testimony
was compounded by a misleading affirmative statement as to the nature
of the available but unused testimony." 19
5. United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 104 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Pa. 1951),
aff'd, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952).
6. Commonwealth v. Karamarkovic, 218 Pa. 405, 408, 67 Ati. 650, 651 (1907).
7. Commonwealth v. Neill, 362 Pa. 507, 520, 67 A.2d 276, 282 (1949).
8. McFarland v. United States, 150 F.2d 593, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; Common-
wealth v. Palermo, 368 Pa. 28, 33, 81 A.2d 540, 542 (1951); Commonwealth v.
Karamarkovic, 218 Pa. 405, 408, 67 AtI. 650, 651 (1907).
9. United States v. Rutkin, 212 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1954); State v. Guilfoyle,
109 Conn. 124, 145 At!. 761 (1929) ; State v. Searles, 108 Vt. 236, 184 Atl. 701
(1936).
10. Jordon v. Bondy, 114 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y.
140, 150, 186 N.E. 422, 425 (1933); Commonwealth v. Neill, 362 Pa. 507, 520, 67
A.2d 276, 282 (1949).
11. Cumulative evidence has been defined as "Additional or corroborative evi-
dence to the same point. That which goes to prove what has already been established
by other evidence." See BLAcK, LAW DICTIONARY 455 (4th ed. 1951).
12. In re Curtis, 36 F. Supp. 408, 410 (D.C. 1941), af'd, Curtis v. Rives, 123
F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
13. Ibid.
14. Goodman v. State, 20 Ala. App. 392, 102 So. 486 (1924) ; Raynor v. Wil-
mington Ry., 129 N.C. 195, 39 S.E. 821 (1901); Jordan v. Commonwealth, 181
Va. 490, 25 S.E.2d 249 (1943) ; Pollock v. State, 136 Wis. 136, 116 N.W. 851 (1908).
15. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 113 F. Supp. 807, 810 (W.D. Pa.
1953).
16. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763, 765 (3d Cir. 1955).
17. See note 15 supra. The court said that the officer's name was not indorsed
on the indictment, but it was not deliberately omitted to conceal his identity.
18. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763, 768 (3d Cir. 1955).
19. Id. at 769 (concurring opinion).
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While not as clear cut as United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi,2° the
instant case does present a factual picture justifying habeas corpus.21
While courts move with caution in labeling actions as suppression of evi-
dence, they will not hesitate to do so when convinced that fundamental
unfairness is involved. The case also illustrates the proposition that evi-
dence ordinarily irrelevant (here sobriety or drunkenness after a crime)
may be of the utmost importance in assuring the court's notion of a fair
trial to the criminal defendant when such evidence may have been used to
counteract similar damaging evidence introduced by opposing counsel.
Joseph F. Monaghan
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE-
SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
Rhodes v. United States (5th Cir. 1955).
The defendant was observed by federal officers who saw him drive
an automobile to a wooded area, park, and walk about a hundred yards
into a field. The officers investigated and arrested the defendant for oper-
ating a still. They then took the automobile keys from the defendant's
pocket and searched the car. Inside they found a half-pint bottle of un-
taxed whiskey which was used as evidence to convict the defendant of
possessing untaxed liquor. Defendant appealed on the grounds that the
evidence used against him was obtained by an unlawful search and seizure.
The circuit court affirmed the conviction and held that the area which can
be rightfully searched pursuant to a lawful arrest must be reasonable under
the circumstances and is not confined to a fixed radius. Rhodes v. United
States, 224 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1955).1
Constitutional provisions respecting search and seizure are concerned
with unreasonable searches and seizures.2 There is no formula to deter-
mine reasonableness contained in the Constitution and each case must be
20. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949), habeas corpus granted, 104 F. Supp. 321(E.D. Pa. 1951), aff'd, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952). In the Almeida case the
prosecution withheld evidence that the fatal bullet was fired from a police revolver
and not that of the accused. It is noteworthy that the district court said in com-
paring the Almeida case with the instant one that: "The difference between the
Almeida case and this one is that in the former the court found active suppression of
evidence, here the most that can be said is that prosecuting officers did not actively
assist relator in preparing his defense." United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye,
113 F. Supp. 807, 811 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
21. "The only practical standard for habeas corpus is the presence or absence
of judicial character in the proceeding as a whole." Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667,
670 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
1. Rhodes v. United States, 224 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1955).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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decided on its own facts. 8 Obviously, a search pursuant to a valid warrant
is not unreasonable. 4  Protection from unreasonable searches and seizures
under the fourth amendment extends to both federal and state action.5
Such illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible in the federal courts.6 In
the federal courts the evidence will be suppressed even if it is obtained
in violation of the rights of someone other than the defendant. 7 However,
in a prosecution in a state court for a state crime, the 14th amendment
does not prohibit the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable
search and seizure 8 unless the evidence is acquired in such an unreasonable
manner that it violates fundamental notions of fairness and decency.9 A
person does not have to prove that his possession was lawful in order to
assert the constitutional protection.' 0 Furthermore, an illegal search can-
not be made legal by what it reveals," and general exploratory searches for
purposes of uncovering evidence of crime, either with or without a search
warrant, are unreasonable and, therefore, within the constitutional ban.12
The search is limited to the time and place of the arrest 18 and originally the
search was confined to the person of the accused. 14 The area of allowable
search has been extended in recent years. It includes those objects which
are in the immediate control of the person arrested and which may be used
to prove the offense in the prosecution against him.1 The rule is more
liberal in a mobile situation. A search without a warrant is permitted if
there is a reasonable basis for belief that a crime has been committed, based
3. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
4. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
5. Ibid.
6. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). But such evidence may be
introduced to impeach the credibility of a witness. Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62 (1954).
7. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
8. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
9. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (The principal evidence was obtained
by applying a stomach pump to the defendant).
10. United States v. Descy, 284 Fed. 724 (D.C.R.I. 1922).
11. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
12. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 341 (1931); Harris v. United States, 151 F.2d 837
(10th Cir. 1945).
13. In United States v. Coffman, 50 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Cal. 1943), the defend-
ant was arrested in a field one-quarter mile from his house on a lawful warrant.
It was held illegal to take him to his house and search it; but, search of a person's
house differs from search of his automobile if, for no other reason, because an
automobile is so easily moved. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Kelley v. United States, 61 F.2d
843 (8th Cir. 1932), a liquor law violator fled from his barn and was arrested one
hundred feet away. Officers were held authorized to search the barn. The defendant
was arrested inside a store for a liquor law violation and it was held legal for officers
to walk outside to the curb and search his automobile. United States v. Young, 45
F.2d 80 (E.D.N.Y. 1931).
14. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
15. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) ; Marion v. United States,
275 U.S. 192 (1927); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Carroll .v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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on facts existing at the time of the search and known to the officer, and
where there is a possibility of escape because of the factor of mobility.' 6
In a static situation, the furthest extension by the Supreme Court up to the
present time was to sanction the search of a desk, safe, and file cabinet
of a one-room place of business incident to a lawful arrest.17 The Rhodes
case goes one step farther. The court reasons that the proximity in time
of the defendant's acts in going to the field from the car, the arrest in the
field, and the subsequent search of the car were all part of one transaction.
A combination of this factor and "the observed connection between the acts
of defendants at the car and at the still site, made the search reasonable,
and the fact that the car was situated somewhat farther away than in the
reported cases is not a significant distinction."'
Obviously, the instant case is an extension of the original doctrine
which permitted a search without a warrant pursuant to a lawful arrest in
order to protect the arresting officer and to prevent the prisoner from
escaping. Considering the proximity of the car to the place of arrest, the
factor of mobility, and the virtually certain knowledge that illegal liquor
would be found in the car, the result is reasonable. However, the courts
should be cautious in extending the concept of reasonableness of a search
without a warrant. Although each individual deviation may seem war-
ranted, nevertheless, the cumulative effect of this steady erosion may have
a decided effect on a jealously guarded constitutional right.
Thomas F. Burns.
EVIDENCE-ADIRALTY--SURVIVOR COMPETENT
WITNESS AGAINST DECEDENT'S INTEREST.
Taylor v. Crain (3d Cir. 1955).
Libellant, a seaman, brought an action in the federal district court to
recover damages for injuries sustained in an accident aboard the defend-
ant's vessel. One defendant died between the time of the alleged accident
and the filing of the suit and his executrix was substituted as defendant.
At the trial the seaman attempted to testify as to the accident and also as
to an alleged contract whereby the deceased defendant promised to employ
the seaman for life. The trial judge excluded this testimony under the
16. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
17. "We think the District Court's conclusion that here the search and seizure
were reasonable should be sustained because: (1) the search and seizure were
incident to a valid arrest; (2) the place of the search was a business room to which
the public, including the officers, was invited; (3) the room was small and under the
immediate control of respondent; (4) the search did not extend beyond the room
used for unlawful purposes; (5) the possession of the forged and altered stamps was
a crime; just as it is a crime to possess burglars' tools, lottery tickets or counterfeit
money." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 63 (1950).
18. Rhodes v. United States, 224 F.2d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 1955).
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Pennsylvania "dead man" statute of 1887.1 The court of appeals held that
the trial court when hearing an admiralty case was no longer bound by
the Pennsylvania "dead man" statute and should have permitted libellant
to introduce the testimony. Taylor v. Crain, 224 F.2d 237 (1955) .2
Admiralty courts in the United States had their own rules of evidence
beginning with the Process Act of 1789.3 In 1862 Congress passed an act
relating to the competency of witnesses which provided that:
"The laws of the State in which the court shall be held shall be
the rules of decision as to the competency of witnesses in the courts
of the United States, in trials at common law, in equity, and ad-
miralty." 4
Thus, state rules governing competency of witnesses were to be applied
in admiralty. The various statutes concerning competency of witnesses
and testimony of survivors were consolidated in 1878 becoming Revised
Statutes, section 858.5 Pennsylvania enacted its "dead man" statute0
in 1887 as a result of which a survivor was incompetent to testify at any
trial in admiralty held in Pennsylvania. However, in 1948 Congress re-
pealed section 858 of the Revised Statutes 7 and at the same time gave
broader power to the Supreme Court to prescribe the admiralty rules for
district courts.8 The repealed section 858 pertained to the competency of
witnesses and not to the admissibility of evidence. 9 However, as stated
in the Taylor case:
"The Supreme Court has promulgated no rule to provide for
the repealed section 858. Nevertheless, the rule tying the admiralty
court to the local rules of competence has been put in the legislative
wastebasket." 10
The problem thus becomes one of determining a rule of competency, in the
absence of a pronouncement from the Supreme Court, in trials before an
admiralty court which is no longer bound by the state rule pertaining to
such competency. This in turn depends on whether the lower federal court
may make its own rule regarding competency of witnesses or whether it
must revert to the admiralty standard in use prior to section 858. Judge
McLaughlin, dissenting in the principal case, would follow this latter course
on the theory that section 858 merely embodied the old admiralty rule
and upon its repeal "resort must be had to the previously established sur-
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 322 (1930).
2. Taylor v. Crain, 224 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1955).
3. 1 STAT. 93 (1789).
4. 12 STAT. 588, C. 189 § 1 (1862).
5. REv. STAT. §858 (1878).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §322 (1930).
7. 62 STAT. 993 (1948).
8. 28 U.S.C. 2073 (1948).
9. Downes v. Wall, 176 Fed. 657 (5th Cir. 1910).
10. Taylor v. Crain, 224 F.2d 237, 239 (3d Cir. 1955).
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vivor principle." n While this is the general rule at common law,' 2 courts
of admiralty are not bound by common law rules. Furthermore, the
simultaneous grant of broader power to the Supreme Court by Congress
in repealing section 858 indicates an intent to free admiralty courts from
the old traditional rules. In a case decided subsequent to this grant of
broader power, the third circuit held that the section giving the Supreme
Court the power to regulate the practice in admiralty courts was not an
attempt to circumscribe the power of the lower federal courts to follow
the traditional rules embodied in former statutes.' 3 But this does not mean
that they must follow the former statutes. In the absence of a compelling
statute (as that repealed in this case) or rules laid down by the Supreme
Court, the lower federal courts may make their own rules of procedure.'
4
This is just what the court in the instant case has done. Rather than go
back to the "dead man" rule they have taken a stride forward in refusing to
be bound by it.
"The rule excluding a survivor's testimony seems to stand in the al-
most unique situation of being condemned by all of the modern writers
on the law of evidence." 15 Little is gained and much is lost by adhering
to the "dead man" rule. Little difficulty has been experienced by those
states having statutes which allow the testimony of the interested survivor
to come in freely and protect the estates of deceased persons by also ad-
mitting in evidence the relevant entries, memoranda, and declarations of
the deceased. 16 In the light of the many opportunities for introducing
rebutting evidence most of the reasons for the rule disappear. The pro-
priety of doing away with the rule in the instant case is even more pro-
nounced. Being a non-jury trial the problem of taking precautions against
the inexperience of lay jurors is nonexistent.
Joseph R. McDonald
MANDAMUS-PUBLIC RIGHTS-RIGHT OF
PRIVATE CITIZEN TO ENFORCE.
State ex rel. Skilton v. Miller (Ohio 1955).
In a proceeding for a writ of mandamus relator sought to compel the
judge and clerk of a city police court to issue a warrant against one Miether
for a violation of a Sunday closing law. The respondents demurred on the
11. Ibid. at 241.
12. Parr v. Paynter, 78 Ind. App. 639, 137 N.E. 70 (1922) ; Stone v. Independent
Linen Service Co., 212 Miss. 580, 55 So. 2d 165 (1951).
13. Dowling v. Isthmian S.S. Corp., 184 F.2d 758, 764 (3d Cir. 1950).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1950) ; The Hudson, 15 Fed. 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1883) ; The
St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 Black.) 180 (1862).
15. Wright v. Wilson, 154 F.2d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 1946) citing in note 23
thereto criticisms by Wigmore, Model Code of Evidence of the American Law
Institute, Bentham, and Chamberlayne.
16. Callahan and Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 47 YALE L.J. 194, 200 (1937).
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ground that the petition did not state a good cause of action. The demurrer
was sustained by the Ohio Court of Appeals. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Ohio, held, affirmed. In the absence of a showing of injury to the
relator in a manner different from that of the general public he is not a
party beneficially interested as required by the Ohio statute.' State ex rel.
Skilton v. Miller, 128 N.E.2d 47 (Ohio 1955).2
Generally mandamus can be defined as a writ from a common law
court commanding the performance of an act which the law specially en-
joins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.8  It is necessary
that there be a clear and unequivocal duty to perform the act before the
writ can be maintained. 4  Therefore, it must be established that the duty
is ministerial rather than discretionary. 5  There is a correlative right that
must be present in the relator, and that also must be clear.6 However,
there is a direct conflict as to the basis and extent of this right. On the one
hand it has been held that the relator's interest must be personal and direct. 7
Under such a rule it would follow that an individual cannot bring mandamus
to enforce a public duty unless he can show a right independent of that
which he holds with the public at large.8  Many statutes deal with theprob-
lem by stating that the relator must have "a beneficial interest." 9 Such
statutes add little to the solution of the problem since the question of
defining "a beneficial interest" remains open. In fact, it has been held that
such language should be liberally construed to promote the ends of justice.10
The opposing view is that the relator need not show any special interest
1. OHIo REv. CODE §2731.02 (1953).
2. State ex rel. Skilton v. Miller, 128 N.E.2d 47 (Ohio 1955).
3. IOWA CODE ANN. §661 (Supp. 1954); OHio Ray. CODE §2731.01 (1953);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1911 (Supp. 1954); HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL
REMEDIES § 1 (2d ed. 1884).
4. People ex tel. Albright v. Board of Trustees of Firemen's Pension Fund, 103
Colo. 1, 82 P.2d 765 (1938) ; State ex tel. Indian Hill Acres, Inc. v. Kellogg, 149
Ohio St. 461, 79 N.E.2d 319 (1948); State ex tel. Stanley v. Cook, 146 Ohio
St. 348, 66 N.E.2d 207 (1946).
S. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) ; City of Whittier v.
Dixon, 24 Cal.2d 664, 151 P2d 5 (1944); Kaufman Const. Co. v. Halcomb, 357 Pa.
514, 55 A.2d 534 (1947).
6. State ex rel. Jacobsmeyer v. Thatcher, 338 Mo. 622, 92 S.W.2d 640 (1936);
see Zielinski v. Harding, 177 Misc. 773, 31 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
7. United States ex rel. New York Warehouse, Wharf & Terminal Ass'n, Inc.
v. Dern, 63 App. D.C. 28, 68 F.2d 773 (1934), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 642 (1934).
8. Mentzer Bush & Co. v. Schoolbook Commission, 142 Kan. 442, 49 P.2d 969(1935) (Publisher can compel state schoolbook commission to perform on contract
for purchase of books) ; Siegemund v. Building Commissioner, 259 Mass. 329, 156
N.E. 852 (1927) (Next door neighbor sufficiently aggrieved by violation of zoning
laws to compel their enforcement) ; State ex rel. Vastine v. Cincinnati, 56 Ohio
App. 526, 11 N.E.2d 188 (1937) (The niece of a deceased city employee had right
to mandamus to compel payment of benefits by trustees of city retirement system).
See 43 COLUM. L. REV. 124 (1943).
9. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §661.9 (Supp. 1954); OHIO Rav. CODE §2731.02
(1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1913 (Supp. 1954).
10. State ex reL. Byers v. Bailey, 7 Iowa 390 (1858).
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other than that of a citizen." The reason assigned for the rule is that the
general public should be considered as the real party in interest. 12 Never-
theless, the relator must show that his interests as a citizen were injuriously
affected by the wrong of which he complains. 13 Under this view it has been
held that a private citizen suffers the required injury if a judicial officer
refuses to perform a duty imposed by statute.' 4
The cases embracing this latter view appear to have disregarded the
vital function of public officers in the judicial process. The discretion
exercised by these officials in determining the cases which should ulti-
mately be decided in a court of law is an invaluable primary duty of our
present judicial system.' 5 The courts depend on the judgment of these
officials and therefore are required to hear only those cases which present
a true controversy. However, if there is an apparent disregard or derelic-
tion of the duty to exercise discretion there should be some remedy for the
one adversely affected. This is the function of mandamus. It appears as
an exception to the general rule and serves as a check on the abuse of
official discretion. Therefore, since the writ permits the indirect exercise
of a public function by a private individual, the relator should be required
to show a personal interest in the writ. This is the position of the court
in the instant case and it is founded on policy considerations. Since the
relator could only show the general interest of a citizen he was not so
beneficially interested in the law so as to be entitled to mandamus.
John C. Voss
NEGLIGENCE-AssuMPTION OF RISK-PRESENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S
ENGINEER-EFFECT ON MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY
FOR DEFECT IN DESIGN.
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co. (6th Cir. 1955).
The airline brought this action against an aircraft manufacturer to
recover damages for alleged negligence by the manufacturer in the design
11. Union Pacific R.R. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343 (1876) (Mandamus to require a
railroad to operate as required by law) ; In re Whitney, 3 N.Y. Supp. 838 (Sup. Ct.
1889) (Mandamus by private citizen to compel police commissioners to prohibit
the after hours sale of intoxicating liquors) ; State ex rel. Williams v. Glander,
80 Ohio App. 527, 69 N.E.2d 226 (1946), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 817 (1947) (Citizen
brings mandamus to compel tax commissioner to levy personal property tax against
Department of Liquor Control) ; State ex rel. Trauger v. Nash, 66 Ohio St. 612,
64 N.E. 558 (1902) (Citizen has sufficient beneficial interest to compel governor to
provide for election of public official).
12. State ex rel. Williams v. Glander, 80 Ohio App. 527, 69 N.E.2d 226 (1946),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 817 (1947), State ex rel. Johnson v. Sevier, 339 Mo. 483, 485,
98 S.W.2d 677, 678 (1936) (dictum).
13. People ex rel. Van Dyke v. Colorado Cent. R.R., 42 Fed. 638 (C.C.D. Colo.
1890).
14. In re Whitney, 3 N.Y. Supp. 838 (Sup. Ct. 1889) ; Benners v. State ex rel.
Heflin, 124 Ala. 97, 26 So. 942 (1899).
15. Wyzanski, Process and Pattern: The Search for Standards n the Law, 30
INi. L.J. 133, 135 (1955).
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and manufacture of the Martin "202" airplane. The airline claimed that
the manufacturer was negligent in the design and construction of certain
wing joints, which proved to be the cause of an accident, in that he had
used an aluminum alloy in the construction of these wing joints which was
known to be subject to greater metal fatigue than alloys previously used.
Martin contended that even if there was a finding of negligence, Northwest
had assumed the risk of danger. It based this defense on the fact that the
airline was represented at the Martin plant by its own resident engineer,
two or three inspectors, and a group of pilots and various other personnel
during the time that the airplanes in question were being built. It appears
from the record that these people did recommend various changes in design
and manufacture of these airplanes. The District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio instructed the jury that it could consider the issue of
assumption of the risk. The jury returned a verdict for the manufacturer.
On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the judg-
ment for the manufacturer was reversed on the grounds that the evidence
did not warrant submitting this issue to the jury. Northwest Airlines v.
Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955). 1
There have been but a few cases dealing specifically with the liability
of aircraft manufacturers to airlines or third parties. 2  Some third parties
have recovered from the manufacturer for error in design; 3 although one
such case was argued on the basis of negligent design it was actually de-
cided on other grounds.4  The doctrine of assumption of the risk has been
stated as applicable where the plaintiff, with knowledge of the risk, has en-
tered into a relationship with the defendant which involves this risk and
in so doing has been regarded as tacitly or impliedly agreeing to take his
chances.5 In addition there are many risks which are not, in any real
sense, voluntarily assumed by the plaintiff, but which he assumes as a
matter of law.6 The doctrine had its inception in cases dealing with the
master-servant relationship 7 but it is not necessarily confined to this type
situation.8 Its effect is not to absolve the wrongdoer of all blame, but to
1. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir.
1955). There were subsidiary issues involved in the case which will not be discussed
in this Recent Decision, namely, contributory negligence with respect to the wing
inspection as well as with the use of radar, and the question of the district court's
rulings on admissibility of evidence.
2. Comment, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 109 (author presents analysis of cases and also
notes that, up to that time, the assumption of the risk doctrine had never been in-
voked in an aviation case of the type involved here.).
3. DeVito v. United Air Lines, 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951); Chapman
Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949) (dealt with aviation
only in that it was a suit for damages caused by crop dusting).4. American Airways v. Ford Motor Co., 258 App. Div. 957, 17 N.Y.S.2d 998
(1st Dep't 1940), afl'd, 284 N.Y. 807, 31 N.E.2d 925 (1940) (manufacturer's in-
spector should have noticed crack in metal which caused engine to rip off).
5. PROSsER, THE LAW OF ToRTs (2d ed. 1955).
6. Fleming, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952).
7. E.g., Duffey v. Consolidated Block Co., 147 Iowa 225, 124 N.W. 609 (1910);
Clairmont v. Cilley, 85 N.H. 1, 153 At. 465 (1931); Maher v. Wagner, 62 S.D.
227, 252 N.W. 647 (1934); Faulkner v. Mammoth Mining Co., 23 Utah 437, 66
Pac. 799 (1901).
& Adams' Adm'r v. Callis & Hughes, 253 Ky. 382, 69 S.W.2d 711 (1934).
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reduce the duty owed to the injured party insofar as this duty is encom-
passed by the risk assumedY The doctrine is generally founded on a con-
sensual or policy basis and is not always easily distinguished from the some-
what similar doctrine of contributory negligence.' 0 In order to invoke the
doctrine of assumed risk, it must be shown that the plaintiff knew of the
risk " or that he should have known of it. 12  Knowledge of the risk is the
watchword 18 and it is settled that a plaintiff cannot assume a risk of which
he is ignorant. 1 4  Age or a lack of information and experience have been
held sufficient to negate consent on the part of the plaintiff. 15 It is apparent
that an objective standard must be applied so that the plaintiff cannot be
heard to say he wasunaware of a risk which must have been obvious to
him.' 6 Some courts have held that it is possible for a plaintiff to assume
risks the specific existence of which he was unaware.17 However, this does
not mean that he assumes obscure and completely unknown risks, which are
not naturally incident to the situation in which he has placed himself; I
and of course one need not anticipate that he will be exposed to a hazard not
naturally incidental to his position.'? Usually, his knowledge and apprecia-
tion of the danger will be a question for the jury.20 In the instant case, the
9. Schleif v. Grigsly, 88 Cal. App. 174, 263 Pac. 255 (1928).
10. E.g., St. Louis Cordage Co. v. Miller, 126 Fed. 495 (8th Cir. 1903); City
of Linton v. Maddox, 75 Ind. App. 449, 130 N.E. 810 (1921); United Railways &
Electric Co. v. Riley, 109 Md. 327, 71 Atl. 970 (1909); Cobia v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 188 N.C. 487, 125 S.E. 18 (1924) ; Louisiana & T. Lumber Co. v. Brown,
50 Tex. Civ. App. 482, 109 S.W. 950 (1908). Yet there are cases in which
it is essential that the distinction be made. This is particularly true in jurisdictions
adhering to the rule of comparative negligence or in cases hinging on the degree
of negligence involved (wanton, gross, wilful).
11. E.g., Fred Harvey Corp. v. Mateas, 170 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1948) ; Lunsford
v. Standard Oil of Cal., 84 Cal. App. 2d 459, 191 P.2d 82 (1948) ; Perroni v. Savings
Bank of Tolland, 128 Conn. 679, 25 A.2d 45 (1942) ; McEvoy v. City of New York,
266 App. Div. 445, 42 N.Y.S.2d 746 (2d Dep't 1943), aff'd, 292 N.Y. 654, 55
N.E.2d 517 (1944); Flynn v. Sharon Steel Corp., 142 Ohio St. 145, 50 N.E.2d
319 (1943).
12. Huestis v. Laphams' Estate, 113 Vt. 191, 32 A.2d 115 (1943).
13. Cincinnati, N.O. & TP. Ry. v. Thompson, 236 Fed. 1 (6th Cir. 1916).
14. Calanchine v. Bliss, 88 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1937); Baltimore & 0. S.W. R.R.
v. Carroll, 200 Ind. 589, 163 N.E. 99 (1928); Shanney v. Boston Madison Square
Garden Co., 296 Mass. 168, 5 N.E.2d 1 (1936) ; Campbell v. Pure Oil Co., 15 N.J.
Misc. 723, 194 Atl. 873 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
15. Hanley v. California Bridge & Construction Co., 127 Cal. 232, 59 Pac.
577 (1899) ; Moore v. City of Bloomington, 51 Ind. App. 283, 95 N.E. 374 (1912) ;
Ciriach v. Merchants' Woolen Co, 151 Mass. 152, 23 N.E. 829 (1890); Gill v.
Homrighausen, 79 Wis. 634, 48 N.W. 862 (1891).
16. Lemoine v. Springfield Hockey Ass'n., 307 Mass. 122, 29 N.E.2d 716 (1940);
Moder v. City of Elizabeth, 224 Minn. 556, 29 N.W.2d 453 (1947) ; Tite v. Omaha
Coliseum Co., 144 Neb. 22, 12 N.W.2d 90 (1943); Morris v. Cleveland Hockey
Club, 157 Ohio St. 225, 105 N.E.2d 419 (1952).
17. Duke v. Gray, 69 N.H. 670, 46 At. 1049 (1899); Peterson v. American
Ice Co., 83 N.J.L. 570, 83 At. 872 (Err. & App. 1912) ; Miller v. Moran Bros. Co.,
39 Wash. 631, 81 Pac. 1089 (1905)
18. Campbell v. Pure Oil Co., 15 N.J. Misc. 723, 194 Atl. 873 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
19. Peoples Drug Stores v. Windham, 178 Md. 172, 12 A.2d 532 (1940).
20. Union Pacific R.R. v. Blank, 167 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1948) (assumption
of risk is for jury); Worcester v. Pure Torpedo Co., 140 F.2d 358 (7th Cir.
1944). See also PRossER, THE LAw OF TORTS (2d ed. 1955).
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defect in design centered about the type material used in a specific wing
splice. More than five hundred Martin engineers had worked on the air-
plane project, whereas the airline had one resident engineer and two or
three inspectors in the manufacturer's plant during the design and manu-
facturing phases of the construction. There was disputed testimony con-
cerning the obviousness of the defect. On these facts, the circuit court
ruled as a matter of law that the issue of assumption of the risk should
not have been submitted to the jury.
It has become common practice for large industrial buyers to place
resident engineers in the plants of their suppliers to insure the desired
design and construction of the purchased product. The presence of these
employees may have a decided effect on the defense of assumption of the
risk when the purchaser brings an action against the supplier for negligent
design. It is doubtful that this decision of the circuit court will affect the
availability of this defense to manufacturers in general. The design of an
airplane is highly involved and it is very improbable that one resident
engineer should be charged with knowledge of the defective design of a
single wing splice. Nevertheless, the assignment of engineers and other
airline personnel to supervise the design and construction of aircraft, al-
though commendable from a safety standpoint, places a certain degree of
responsibility on the airline. The inspecting personnel should be charged
with knowledge of the subject matter in the fields in which they are quali-
fied. Provided these employees have a reasonable opportunity to inspect,
and in the absence of unanticipated technological advances, the issue of as-
sumption of the risk should be submitted to the jury.
James A. Matthews, Jr.
TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-ATTRACTIVE
NUISANCE-LUMBER PILE.
Kahn v. James Burton Co. (Ill. 1955).
Lumber had been delivered by the defendant lumber company to a lot
on which the defendant was erecting a house. Suit was brought against
the lumber company and the contractor for injuries sustained by an eleven
year old boy when the lumber pile collapsed while he was playing on it.
There was a verdict and judgment against the lumber company and the
contractor for $20,000. The appellate court reversed and held as a matter
of law that the pile of lumber was not a dangerous instrumentality and that
the lumber company and the contractor were not negligent. The Supreme
Court of Illinois reversed and held that whether the lumber had been piled
so as to create an unreasonable danger to children playing thereon and
whether it had been so attractive to children as to suggest the probability
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that children would climb onto it were questions for the jury. Kahn v.
James Burton Co., 126 N.E.2d 836 (Ill. 1955).'
Formerly, a landowner was not liable for harm to trespassers, adult
or infant, caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in making his
land safe for them.2 However, late in the nineteenth century an exception
to tlis rule was recognized in the United States.3  This was the "turn-
table", or as it is now more commonly known, the "attractive nuisance"
doctrine. While the doctrine had its inception in a case involving a railroad
turntable it has been extended to cover a variety of situations. 4 The effect
of the doctrine is to hold liable any landowner who maintains on his prem-
ises a condition which is attractive and dangerous to children of tender
years who come upon the premises and are injured by this condition.5
While the purpose of the doctrine is clear, such confusion has resulted in
its application that one authority has observed that "some courts are very
humane, almost foolishly so; while others seem to be constituted of un-
married or childless men--courts of barons so to speak." 6 Some courts
have completely rejected the doctrine as a piece of sentimental humani-
tarianism 7 while others have accepted it with varying degrees of en-
thusiasm. 8 Most of those accepting the doctrine have limited its applica-
tion by requiring that one or more of the following conditions be met before
the doctrine can be invoked: the instrumentality must be "inherently dan-
gerous"; 9 the person sought to be held liable must have control or the right
1. Kahn v. James Burton Co., 126 N.E.2d 836 (II1. 1955).
2. Laidlaw v. Perrozzi, 278 P.2d 523 (Cal. 1955) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 333
(1934); PROSSER, TORTS § 76 (2d ed. 1955).
3. Sioux City and Pacific Ry. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657 (1874) ; the decision in
this case was apparently rooted in the earlier English case of Lynch v. Nurdin,
1 Q.B. 29, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841).
4. Harrison v. Chicago, 308 Il1. App. 263, 31 N.E.2d 359 (1941) (newsstand);
Smith v. Mason Fruit Jar and Bottle Co., 84 Kan. 551, 144 Pac. 845 (1911)
(ventilator fan in factory); Rachmel v. Clark, 205 Pa. 314, 54 Atl. 1027 (1903)
(slab of slate); Hayes v. Southern Power Co., 95 S.C. 230, 78 S.E. 956 (1913)
(electric wires).
5. See United Zinc and Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268, 277 (1922) (dis-
senting opinion) ; McDermott v. Burke, 256 Ill. 401, 100 N.E. 168 (1912) ; Twist
v. Winona and St. Peter R.R., 39 Minn. 164, 39 N.W. 402 (1888).
6. Browne, The Allurement of Infants, 31 AM. L. REv. 891, 892 (1897).
7. Lewis v. Mains, 104 A.2d 432 (Me. 1954) ; State v. Baltimore Fidelity Ware-
house Co., 176 Md. 341, 4 A.2d 739 (1939); Lefler v. Pennsylvania R.R., 203
Misc. 887, 118 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Ware v. Cincinnati, 93 Ohio App.
431, 111 N.E.2d 401 (1952) ; Previte v. Wanskuck Co., 90 A.2d 769 (R.I. 1952)
Trudo v. Lazarus, 116 Vt. 221, 73 A.2d 306 (1950).
8. Gimmestead v. Rose Bros., 194 Minn. 531, 261 N.W. 194 (1935) (the court
held that whether a lumber pile was an attractive nuisance was a jury question);
Slattery v. Drake, 130 Ore. 693, 281 Pac. 846 (1929) (court in refusing to apply the
attractive nuisance doctrine to a pile of timber said whether a thing is an attractive
nuisance is a matter of law for the court to decide).
9. State ex rel. W. E. Callahan Const. Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 1209, 159 S.W.2d
1209 (1941); Boyette v. Atlantic Coast Line, 227 N.C. 406, 42 S.E.2d 468 (1947).
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to control the premises on which the condition is maintained; "I and the
condition which attracted the child, or something inseparably connected
with it, must be the proximate cause of the injury." The court in the Kahn
case stated: "The naming or labeling of a certain set of facts as being an
'attractive nuisance' case or a 'turntable' case has often led to undesirable
conclusions. . . . the only proper bases for decisions in such cases deal-
ing with personal injuries to children are the customary rules of ordinary
negligence." 12 It then proceeded to examine closely the facts of the case,
particularly, the condition of the lumber pile, its proximity to the inter-
section of two public alleys, and the fact that it was delivered during sum-
mer vacation in a populous community. From this examination the court
concluded that the jury could properly find that the defendants did not
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. 13
It is apparent that whether or not an injured party is a trespasser,
whether he is an adult or a child; whether or not he was "induced" to come
on the premises by the instrument which injured him, are not factors which,
of themselves, will determine the outcome of negligence cases in Illinois.
It is the cumulative effect of all these circumstances which will be weighed
by the Illinois court in arriving at its decision. This is presently the ap-
proach in a few states.1 4 Insofar as infants are involved, it is also the view
of the American Law Institute. The Institute advocates the imposition
of liability only if: (1) the owner knows or has reason to know that chil-
dren are likely to be present; (2) the condition involves an unreasonable
risk of serious harm to children; (3) the condition is such that children are
not likely to appreciate the danger; and (4) the utility of the condition is
slight compared to the risk to the child involved.15 Reasonable men can
differ as to the conclusion reached in this case since it is simply a matter of
weighing the circumstances. What is important to note, however, is that
the Illinois courts will not look for the presence or absence of an "attractive
nuisance," but will consider the circumstances surrounding each individual
case in order to determine a defendant's standard of care toward trespassing
children. Such an approach to the problem is desirable and should put an
end to the many sophistications which arose under the mechanical rule.
Francis R. O'Hara
10. Constantin Refining Co. v. Martin, 155 Ark. 193, 244 S.W. 37 (1922);
Tavis v. Kansas City, 89 Kan. 547, 132 Pac. 185 (1913).
11. Denver Tramway Corporation v. Callahan, 112 Colo. 460, 150 P.2d 798
(1944) ; McDermott v. Burke, 256 Ill. 401, 100 N.E. 168 (1912).
12. Kahn v. James Burton Co., 126 N.E.2d 836, 841 (Ill. 1955).
13. Id. at 840, 841.
14. Wolfe v. Rehbein, 123 Conn. 111, 193 Atl. 608 (1937); Wagner v. Kepler,
411 Ill. 368, 104 N.E.2d 231 (1951) ; Drew v. Lett, 95 Ind. App. 89, 182 N.E. 547
(1932); Larson v. Equity Cooperative Elevator Co., 248 Wis. 132, 21 N.W.2d
253 (1946).
15. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 339 (1934).
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TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-GUEST STATUTES-
PASSENGER FOR HIRE.
In re Dikeinan's Estate (Kan. 1955).
Husband and wife brought an action against the executrixes of the
automobile owner for loss of services and for personal injuries suffered
by the wife while riding as a passenger in the deceased's automobile. She
and the car owner were returning from a convention of a fraternal or-
ganization to which they were delegates. The petition alleged ordinary
negligence. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the petition and the
wife appealed, thereby putting in issue her status as an occupant of the car.
The Supreme Court of Kansas held that despite the passenger's agreement
with the owner of the automobile that she would pay a reasonable sum for
transportation to a fraternal convention upon return from the convention,
the passenger was a guest within the meaning of the Kansas guest statute'
and could not recover without alleging gross negligence. In re Dikeman's
Estate, 284 P.2d 622 (Kan. 1955).2
Guest statutes are intended to protect the owner or operator of an
automobile from liability to a gratuitous occupant for injuries resulting
from ordinary negligence. 3 Generally, to remove the passenger from the
scope of the guest statute the owner or operatot must receive compensation
for the transportation. 4  This compensation need not be in money. 5  It
need not pass from the passenger to the driver but may come from a third
person.6  But it must be a tangible benefit accruing to the driver.7  If the
1. "That no person who is transported by the owner or operator of a motor
vehicle, as his guest, without payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of
action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or damage, un-
less such injury, death or damage shall have resulted from the gross and wanton
negligence of the operator of such motor vehicle." KAN. GEN. STAT. §8-122b
(1949).
2. In re Dikeman's Estate, 284 P.2d 622 (Kan. 1955).
3. "The Ohio Guest Act and similar acts in other states were undoubtedly en-
acted to carry out a policy of social equity to the effect that the owner or operator
of an automobile should not be made liable to a guest riding therein to whom the
owner or operator is doing a favor or is extending a courtesy, except for wilful
or wanton misconduct on his part, and that a guest should assume the risk of ordi-
nary negligence or acts which are less culpable than wilful or wanton misconduct."
Hasbrook v. Wingate, 152 Ohio St. 50, 87 N.E.2d 87 (1949).
4. Thompson v. Lacey, 42 Cal.2d 443, 267 P.2d 1 (1954) ; Kroiss v. Butler,
277 P.2d 873 (Cal. App. 1954) ; Miller v. Miller, 395 II1. 273, 69 N.E.2d 878
(1946) ; Drea v. Drea, 292 Mass. 477, 198 N.E. 743 (1935) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS,
§490, comment a (1934).
5. Duncan v. Hutchinson, 139 Ohio St. 185, 39 N.E.2d 140 (1942).
6. Thompson v. Lacey, 42 Cal.2d 443, 267 P.2d 1 (1954) ; Elliott v. Behner,
146 Kan. 827, 73 P.2d 1116 (1937) ; McGuire v. Armstrong, 268 Mich. 152, 255
N.W. 745 (1934) ; Blanchette v. Sargent, 87 N.H. 15, 173 Atl. 383 (1934) ; Sprenger
v. Braker, 71 Ohio App. 349, 49 N.E.2d 958 (1942).
7. Thompson v. Lacey, 742 Cal.2d 443, 267 P.2d 1 (1954) Miller v. Miller,
395 Ill. 273, 69 N.E.2d 878 (1946) ; Drea v. Drea, 292 Mass. 477, 198 N.E. 743
(1935).
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payment is only incidental to the requirements of hospitality or gratitude
the guest does not become a passenger for hire.8 However, most jurisdic-
tions agree that a prior arrangement to share expenses makes the guest
a paying passenger, and that any contribution given after this agreement is
not a gratuity but actual payment. 9 This is so even where the purpose of
the trip is only social. 10
The court concedes that the precise question has not been decided by
it before." It therefore relies for authority on a prior decision 12 which it
considers similar. In doing so it does not fully distinguish the cases. In
the prior case the purpose of the trip was purely social 13 and the pay-
ment of all expenses by one couple was clearly reciprocal hospitality.' 4
In the present case the parties were delegates to a convention of a fraternal
organization; the organization had authorized payment of plaintiff's travel
expenses; and an agreement to pay for her transportation was entered into
before the owner agreed to drive the plaintiff.' 5 While the court does not
accept the prevailing view that a prearrangement to pay for the transporta-
tion prevents application of the guest statute, it admitted that the agree-
ment in the instant case was a tangible benefit accruing to the driver. 16
On this ground alone it could have found that the plaintiff was not a "guest"
within the meaning of the guest statute.' 7 By equating "social" with
"fraternal" the court has seemingly distorted the guest statute
i*. . to the extent that whenever the driver is a friend of the party
riding with him there is a community of interest which may be in part
social or pleasure and the rider is a 'guest' irrespective of compensa-
tion to or benefit derived by the driver as a result of the transporta-
tion." 18
Joseph R. McDonald
8. Lee Bros. v. Jones, 114 Ind. App. 688, 54 N.E.2d 108 (1944); Pilcher v.
Erny, 155 Kan. 257, 124 P.2d 461 (1942) ; Olefsky v. Ludwig, 242 App. Div. 637,
272 N.Y. Supp. 158 (2d Dep't 1934); Master v. Horowitz, 237 App. Div. 237, 261
N.Y. Supp. 722 (3d Dep't, aff'd, 262 N.Y. 609, 188 N.E. 86 (1932).
9. Whitmore v. French, 37 Cal. 2d 739, 235 P.2d 3 (1951); Smith v. Clute,
277 N.Y. 407, 14 N.E.2d 455 (1938) ; Campbell v. Campbell, 104 Vt. 468, 162 Atl.
379 (1932); RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 490, comment a (1934).
10. Whitmore v. French, 37 Cal. 2d 739, 235 P.2d 3 (1951) ; Smith v. Clute,
277 N.Y. 407, 14 N.E.2d 455 (1938).
11. In re Dikeman's Estate, 284 P.2d 622, 629 (Kan. 1955).
12. Bedenbender v. Walls, 177 Kan. 531, 280 P.2d 630 (1955).
13. "The record presented supports only the conclusion that the sole purpose
of the trip was the joint pleasure of the parties. Friendship and sociability were
the basis of plaintiff's being in the car." Id. at 636.
14. "In fact, we have no doubt but that at the time in question the parties would
have resented any suggestion that their relationship was anything other than social
and for mutual pleasure." Ibid.
15. The decision being upon demurrer these facts properly alleged in the petition
must be taken as true. Hoffman v. Cudahy Packing Co., 161 Kan. 345, 167 P.2d
613 (1946); Betts v. Easely, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).
16. ". . we are quite certain Dikeman upon his return to Pratt, if he had
lived, could have maintained an action and recovered from appellant on the contract
as pleaded." In re Dikeman's Estate, 284 P.2d 622, 628 (Kan. 1955).
17. KAN. GEN. STAT. §8-122b (1949).
18. In re Dikeman's Estate, 284 P.2d 622, 632 (Kan. 1955) (dissenting opinion).
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TRADE-MARKS-UNFAIR COMPETITION-USE OF
MANUFACTURER'S GOOD WILL BY IMPLICATION.
Schwegmann Bros. v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. (5th Cir. 1955).
Plaintiff,' a manufacturer and distributor of pharmaceutical products,
owned registered trade names of certain products which could be dispensed
only by prescription. These products were not sold to the public but were
advertised and sold directly to physicians, pharmacists, and hospitals. De-
fendant, a retail supermarket, was a non-signer of plaintiff's retail price-
fixing contracts. The defendant filled a customer's prescription for the
trade-marked products at less than the fair trade price after replacing the
manufacturer's label with number-bearing prescription labels. The court
held that by presenting a prescription calling for one of the trade-marked
drugs, the customer impliedly adopted the prescription, whether or not
he knew what was in it. Thus, defendant was held to have violated
Louisiana's Fair Trade Law even though the manufacturer's trade-marks
were removed. Schwegmann Bros. v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 221 F.2d
326 (5th Cir. 1955).2
It was held in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.5
that restraints on alienation of chattels by way of resale price-fixing agree-
ments were invalid under common law and the Sherman Act.4 In the Eli
Lilly case, 5 Judge Wright stated that "after trying unsuccessfully for twenty
years to have Congress pass legislation overcoming the effect of the Dr.
Miles decision, the proponents of fair trade legislation turned their atten-
tion to the state legislatures, before which they have been phenomenally
successful." 6 One of the alleged purposes of such fair trade acts, in per-
nitting price agreements, 7 is to protect the manufacturer's property right
1. For the sake of clarity the court refers to Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., as plaintiff
and Schwegmann Bros. as defendant. Both sides appealed; plaintiff from an order
denying its petition to punish defendant for contempt, defendant from an order amend-
ing a prior injunction entered against it.
2. Schwegmann Bros. v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 221 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3056 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1955) (No. 243).
3. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
4. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
5. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros., 109 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. La. 1953),
aff'd, 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856 (1953). Fair trade
legislation exists today in all states except Texas, Missouri, and Vermont. Fair
trade laws have been enacted in Hawaii and Puerto Rico, but not in the District
of Columbia.
6. Id. at 270.
7. While state fair trade acts have generally been held to be a valid exercise
of the state's police power, the Supreme Courts of Florida and Michigan have held
their respective fair trade laws unconstitutional as applied to non-signers, since, as
applied to the facts of each case, they bore no reasonable relationship to public
health, safety, and welfare. Liquor Store Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40
So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949); Shakespeare Co. v. Lippmann's Sporting Goods Co., 334
Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952).
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in good will." Non-signers 9 are bound by price-fixing agreements upon
notice of their existence.' Commodities bearing the manufacturer's trade-
mark cannot be sold below fixed prices either by signers or by non-signers."
The language of the Louisiana Fair Trade Law 12 would indicate that it is
grounded on the usual economic policy behind such laws of protecting the
good will and trade-mark of a vendor from exploitation. The Supreme
Court has made it clear that such acts interfere only when the non-signer
sells with the aid of the vendor's good will and not when he removes "the
mark or brand from the commodity . . provided he.can do so without
utilizing the good will of the latter as an aid to that end." 13 The circuit
court has adopted this requirement as a sine-qua-non to the constitutionality
of the Louisiana act. 14  But the court points out that the non-signer can-
not fit into this exception "when a customer comes in with a prescription
that designates a trade-marked product." "I The decision is well-reasoned
since the good will established in prescription drug trade-marks is in-
separably bound with prescriptions which physicians write for their
8. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Schwegmann Bros., 109 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. La. 1953),
aff'd, 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856 (1953) ; Calvert
Distillers Corp. v. Stockman, 26 F. Supp. 73 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) ; Houbigant Sales
Corp. v. Woods Cut Rate Store, 123 N.J. Eq. 40, 196 Atl. 683 (Ch. 1937); Port
Chester Wine & Liquor Shop, Inc. v. Miller Bros., 253 App. Div. 188, 1 N.Y.S.2d
802 (2d Dep't 1938), aff'd, 281 N.Y. 101, 22 N.E.2d 253 (1939) ; Guerlain Inc. v.
F. W. Woolworth Co., 170 Misc. 150, 9 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
9. The Federal Fair Trade Act (McGuire Act), 66 STAT. 631, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1952), inter alia, amends the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 STAT. 717 (1914),
15 U.S.C. § 41 (1952). The former provides that the "unfair competition" pro-
visions of state fair trade acts may be used against non-signers without violating
the Federal Trade Commission Act or any of the federal anti-trust laws. The
McGuire Act was passed immediately following the decision in Schwegmann Bros.
v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) which held that the Miller-Tydings
Amendment, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952), to the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, did not exempt from the Sherman Act that part of the state fair trade laws
relating to non-signers.
10. Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Stockman, 26 F. Supp. 73 (E.D.N.Y. 1939)
Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store Inc., 166 Misc. 342, 2 N.Y.S.2d
320 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
11. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183
(1936); Johnson & Johnson v. Weissbard, 121 N.J. Eq. 585, 191 At. 873 (Err.
& App. 1937).
12. "No contract, relating to the sale or resale of a commodity which bears,
or the label or container of which bears, the trade mark, brand, or name of the
producer of the commodity and which is in fair and open competition with com-
modities of the same general class produced by others, shall violate any law of this
state by reason of any of the following provisions which may be contained in the
contract: (1) That the vendee shall not resell the commodity at less than the
minimum price stipulated by the vendor; .... " LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §51:392
(Supp. 1953).
13. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagrams-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183,
195 (1936). See The Pep Boys v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U.S. 198 (1936) ; Schweg-
mann Bros. v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 221 F.2d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1955). The
Old Dearborn case is often cited to uphold the validity of fair trade laws.
14. Schwegmann Bros. v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 221 F.2d 326, 328 (5th
Cir. 1955).
15. Ibid.
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patients. 16 The manufacturer's market is intentionally limited to hospitals,
pharmacists, and doctors. Hence, any exploitation of good will by a non-
signer must be geared to the prescribing physician. It is apparent that
the good will of the manufacturer was utilized in making the sale since
the physician prescribed the drug by its trade name.
The decision is in conformity with both the spirit and policy of the
act as well as its judicial interpretations. As the court stated, the answer
to the non-signers problem lies with the legislature, and up to this time
the proponents of fair-trade agreements have carried the day in this respect.
Joseph F. Monaghan
TRADE UNIONS-INTERNAL DISCIPLINE-
EXPULSION FOR LIFE.
Sanders v. International Association of Bridge Workers, AFL
(W.D. Ky. 1955).
Plaintiff was the president of the local affiliate of the defendant union.
He was charged with a violation of the union constitution by causing a
strike contrary to the union's no-strike agreement with the employer and
refusing to obey defendant's orders to terminate the illegal strike. The
finding of the General Executive Board of the defendant union, after a
hearing, resulted in the plaintiff being forever barred from membership in
the union or any of its local affiliates. The plaintiff appealed from the board
ruling. The district court held that the sentence imposed by the governing
body of the union was unlawful and void in view of its effect upon a mem-
ber's means of obtaining a livelihood. Sanders v. International Association
of Bridge Workers, AFL, 130 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Ky. 1955).1
A labor union is a voluntary unincorporated association whose con-
stitution and bylaws are a contract and an agreement with each individual
member as to rights, privileges, and duties among the members.2 The
association, being purely voluntary, is free to fix the qualifications for
membership and to provide for termination of membership (on a breach of
contract theory) for those who do not meet the standards fixed by the
16. See Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924); Ross-Whitney
Corp. v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 207 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1953).
1. Sanders v. International Association of Bridge Workers, AFL, 130 F. Supp.
253 (W.D, Ky. 1955).
2. Talton v. Behncke, 199 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1952); North Dakota v. North
Central Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 99 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1938);
Preveden v. Croatian Fraternal Union, 120 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Pa. 1954); Local
1104, United Electrical Workers, UE, v. Wagner Electrical Corp., 109 F. Supp.
675 (E.D. Mo. 1951).
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association.3 If there is not a violation of a statute or public policy, the
courts will uphold and respect the enforcement of the constitution and by-
laws.4 These principles are substantially recognized by the court in the
Sanders case. However, in addition to these basic principles, Judge Swin-
ford apparently took judicial notice of the fact that to be employed as an
iron construction worker membership in a union is almost a necessity and
"is no longer voluntary." He then concluded that the expulsion of a union
member for life, or for such an unreasonable term of years as would have
the effect of a life expulsion, is an unlawful use of authority. Under the
National Labor Relations Act it is clear that union membership is not a
legal requisite to employment, although some union security contracts are
valid., With the exception of non-payment of dues or initiation fees, a
union member expelled for life can be employed even though a union secu-
rity agreement exists." This also applies where one has been denied mem-
bership.7 Should the expelled member be dismissed from his employment
for legitimate reasons all he need do when seeking another position, is to
tender dues and initiation fees.8 Judge Swinford does not rely on the Na-
3. An association was allowed to expel one of its member schools for violation
of a rule that no member school shall summarily dismiss staff members and that no
appointee shall be removed before the expiration of his term of service without a
fair hearing. North Dakota v. North Central Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary
Schools, 99 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1938). An injunction against the union was denied
a member because the court held a union could punish a member by fine, suspension,
or expulsion for infraction of union rules. Barker Painting Co. v. Brotherhood of
Painters, 23 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1927); Expulsion of a union business agent from
membership was deemed justified where charges of conduct unbecoming a member
based on an assault and battery committed on another member were found to be
supported by sufficient evidence. Walsh v. International Alliance of Theatrical
Operators, 22 N.J. Misc. 161, 37 A.2d 667 (1944), aff'd, 136 N.J. Eq. 115 (Err.
& App.), 40 A.2d 623 (1945) ; The court recognized that if unions are to achieve
the purposes for which they are organized they must free themselves of members
whose misconduct may be violative of their constitution. The members were reinstated
because of improper procedures in the expulsion proceedings. Barnhart v. United
Automobile Workers, CIO, 12 N.J. Super. 147, 79 A.2d 88 (1951).
4. Talton v. Behncke, 199 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Jennings v. Lee, 295 Fed.
561 (W.D.N.Y. 1923).
5. The Supreme Court has held that § 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act authorizes employers to enter into certain union security contracts, but prohibits
discharge under such contracts unless there is a fnil-re to tender dues or initiation
fees. Radio Officers' Union, AFL v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
6. It is considered an unfair labor practice for a union to ask an employer to
discharge an employee who has been expelled from the union for any reason other
than failure to pay dues or initiation fees. 61 STAT. 141, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (1) (A), (b) (2) (1952), NLRB v. Local 3, Retail Store Union, CIO,
216 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1954).
7. Union Starch & Refining Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1951).
8. In Union Starch & Refining Co. v. NLRB, supra, note 7, at 1012, Judge
Kerner resorted to legislative history to help determine the meaning of the Labor
Management Relations Act. In so doing, he cited the following words snoken by
Senator Taft on the Senate floor while the act was under discussion: "The union
could refuse the man admission to the union, or expel him from the union; but if
he were willing to enter the union and pay the same dues as other members of the
union, he could not be fired from his job because the union refused to take him."
93 CoNG. REc. 4272 (1947).
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tional Labor Relations Act, but bases his opinion on public policy. He
states that union membership is virtually mandatory in getting a job in
this particular industry. Assuming that this is justified by the record, it
is certainly a very important factor to be considered. His position is that
the union does have power to discipline members, but that power must be
limited to the necessities of the situation, and the law will provide relief
where the union action goes beyond this limitation. However, the conduct
in question is very serious. Even in an industry in which union member-
ship is a practical requisite to employment, an election must be made be-
tween giving a union the power to expel its members for grevious matters,
thus subjecting the expelled member to the practical effect mentioned, or
allowing the union to merely suspend its members, thereby taking away
its only effective means of ridding itself of discordant elements. This opens
the door for other members to violate the constitution and bylaws knowing
that the maximum punishment will be suspension for a limited period of
time.
A union must have authority to discipline its members, otherwise it
will have no power to bargain effectively. Expulsion of an offending mem-
ber is not so much a matter of discipline as it is a matter of protection of
the union. The preservation of an organization whose constitution and by-
laws are lawful, by allowing it to expel those who seek to undermine it, is a
stronger basis for a public policy than the possible inability of the resurgent
member to subsequently gain employment in his present occupation.
Henry A. Giuliani
TRADE UNIONS-PEACEFUL PICKETING-
POST-CERTIFICATION.
Douds v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, AFL (2d Cir. 1955).
Pending an adjudication of an alleged union violation of § 8(b) (4) (C)
of the National Labor Relations Act, an employer brought suit to enjoin
the union, which was not the certified bargaining agent of the employees,
from picketing his premises with signs stating that the working conditions
in the employer's bakery were below that of other bakeries and urging the
readers not to buy the employer's products. The picketing commenced
the day after another union was certified as bargaining agent And had con-
tinued up to the time of the action. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the injunction
under § 10(l) of the National Labor Relations Act and held that the evi-
dence was not sufficient to conclude that there was reasonable cause for
believing that the union was engaged in an unfair labor practice. Douds
v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, AFL, 224 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1955).'
1. Douds v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, AFL, 224 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1955).
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Before granting a preliminary injunction under § 10(l), the court
must find that there is reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor prac-
tice was committed.2  For the defendant in this case to be found guilty of
an unfair labor practice under § 8(b) (4) (C), three conditions must be
satisfied: (1) the union must have induced or encouraged the employees
to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal to perform services; (2) such
action must have been for the purpose of forcing or requiring the employer
to recognize or bargain with a union other than the one certified; and (3)
another labor organization must have been certified under the act.8 In
circumstances similar to the Douds case, it has been held that peaceful
picketing by a union was only an exercise of its rights of free speech.4 The
Supreme Court has agreed with this in principle.5 However, peaceful
picketing will be restrained if its objectives are unlawful. 6 Picketing, in
order to be peaceful, must be free of any unlawful act. 7 Some of the estab-
lished unlawful acts are: intimidation of customers, physical obstructions
or interference with business, threats and false representations. 8 However,
organizational picketing does not have an unlawful purpose merely because
it exerts economic pressure on an employer or is carried on without success
for an extended period of time.9
2. "Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (A),(B),(C) of § 158(b) of this
title, the preliminary investigation of such charge should be made. . . . If after
such investigation, the officer . . . to whom the matter may be referred has rea-
sonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint shall issue, he
shall, on behalf of the board, petition any district court . . . within any district
where the unfair labor practice in question has occurred. Upon the filing of any
such petition the district court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief
or restraining order as it deems just and proper ... " 61 STAT. 149 (1947), 29
U.S.C. §160(1) (1952).
3. "§ 158 Unfair Labor Practice . . . (b) it shall be an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents . . . (4) to engage in, or to induce or en-
courage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal
in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or other-
wise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform
any services, where an object thereof is: . . . (C) forcing or requiring any em-
ployer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as the repre-
sentative of his employees if another labor organization has been certified as the
representative of such employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title."
61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (C) (1952).
4. Brown v. Retail Shoe Union, Local 410, AFL, 89 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Cal.
1950).
5. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
6. Local 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, AFL v. Graham, 345 U.S.
192 (1952); Building Service Employees Union, Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S.
532 (1950); International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 309, AFL v. Hanke,
339 U.S. 470 (1950).
7. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 309, AFL v. Hanke, 339 U.S.
470 (1950) ; Senn v. Tile Layers Union, Local 5, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
8. Ibid.
9. Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776, AFL,
346 U.S. 485 (1953); Building Service Employees Union, Local 262 v. Gazzam,
339 U.S. 532 (1950) ; AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) ; Wood v. O'Grady,
307 N.Y. 532, 122 N.E.2d 386 (1954). But see, Pappas v. Stacey, 116 A.2d 497
(Me. 1955), appeal filed August 20, 1955, (Question presented: Does Maine statute,
as construed and applied, abridge Federal Constitution's free speech guarantees?)
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Since § 10(l) requires that the court find reasonable cause to believe
that an unfair labor practice was committed, great weight must be placed
upon the findings of fact in each particular case. In the Douds case, no
employee refused to cross the picket line; the drivers of the trucking com-
panies with which the plaintiff dealt were members of AFL unions affiliated
with the defendant, but the picketing had no effect on their activities; and
in addition, there was no evidence that the picketing had an adverse effect
on the employer's business. In those cases where an injunction against
picketing has been sustained under § 8(b) (4) (C), there has been more
than mere presence of picketing from which the court could reasonably
conclude that an attempt had been made to induce the employees to engage
in some type of concerted activity.10 Judge Swan, in the principal case,
suggests that the intent and possible result of the picketing is to diminish
the membership in the certified union so that eventually the defendant
would get a majority when another election should be held. This he states,
is not an unlawful objective. By thus making a factual inquiry into actual
motives, a just result is reached in maintaining the delicate balance between
the employer's property rights and the labor organization's right to free
speech.
Henry A. Giuliani
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
EXTENSION-ADVANCE PAYMENT OF MEDICAL EXPENSES.
Cook v. Buffalo General Hospital (N.Y. 1955).
In an action for workmen's compensation it was found that plaintiff
was a student nurse who was sent for special training by her general em-
ployer to defendant hospital where she contracted pulmonary tuberculosis.
The disease was not discovered until she returned to her general employer
who then provided her with medical treatment. Plaintiff instituted suit
after the two year statute of limitations would normally expire. The
Workmen's Compensation Board found against the defendant-special em-
ployer on the theory that under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1 the
24 U.S.L. WEEK 3062 (Sept. 20, 1955) (No. 336). In that case the court stated:
"In our view peaceful picketing for organizational purposes is unlawful under our
law, and may be enjoined." Pappas v. Stacey, 116 A.2d 497, 500 (Me. 1955). Also
see, Meltex, Inc. v. Livingston, 28 LABOR CASES f69,416 (N.Y. Oct. 10, 1955)
Boca Raton Club v. Hotel Union, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 2192 (Fla. Nov. 1, 1955).
10. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, AFL v. NLRB,
341 U.S. 694 (1951) ; NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council,
341 U.S. 675 (1951) ; Hoover Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951);
Humphrey v. Local 138, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, 85 F. Supp.
473 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
1. N.Y. WoaK. ComP. LAW J 28.
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grant of medical treatment by the general employer was an advance pay-
ment sufficient to toll the statute of limitations as against the special em-
ployer. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York, held, affirmed.
The defendant special employer was bound by the acts of the general em-
ployer. Cook v. Buffalo General Hospital, 308 N.Y. 480, 127 N.E.2d 66
(1955).2
It is clear that under the Workmen's Compensation Act advance pay-
ment will serve to toll the statute of limitations. 3 Furthermore, most states
hold that part payment in the form of medical expenses is sufficient as an
advance payment. 4  As a refinement of this general principle it has been
held that these advance payments should be effective to toll the statute
only if made in recognition of the employer's liability. This naturally
implies knowledge of the payment on the part of the employer. It there-
fore becomes necessary to define the relationship between a general and a
special employer in order to determine whether an advance payment by one
would bind the other. The courts seem to agree that if there is any legal
relationship between the two it is at most that of independent contractor.6
It is basic to such a relationship that neither the knowledge of nor acts
done by one will be imputed to the other.7 An analogous situation can be
found in the case of a part payment of a stale contract claim. There, as
in the case of advanced payment of medical expenses, it is essential that the
part payment be made in acknowledgment of the obligation.8  In addition
the part payment or new promise must be made by the person liable for
the debt or someone authorized by him.9
2. Cook v. Buffalo General Hospital, 308 N.Y. 480, 127 N.E.2d 66 (1955).
3. "No case in which an advance payment is made to an employee . . . shall
be barred by the failure of the employee . . . to file a claim. . . ." N.Y. WORK.
COMP. LAW §28, Piechocki v. Sattlers, Inc., 268 App. Div. 807, 48 N.Y.S.2d 473
(3d Dep't 1944).
4. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,
195 Cal. 577, 234 Pac. 369 (1925) ; J. F. Imbs Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission,
324 Ill. 416, 155 N.E. 380 (1927); Wood v. Queen City Neon Co., 282 App. Div.
106, 121 N.Y.S.2d 888 (3d Dep't 1953), appeal denied, 306 N.Y. 985, 115 N.E.2d
440 (1953) ; Glowney v. Statler's Restaurant, 267 App. Div. 1020, 48 N.Y.S.2d 147
(3d Dep't 1944), appeal dismissed, 293 N.Y. 854, 59 N.E.2d 442 (1944). For cases
contra see 20 Miss. L.J. 236 (1949).
5. Urboniak v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 279 App. Div. 813, 109 N.Y.S.2d 133 (3d
Dep't 1952); Lombardo v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 275 App. Div. 18, 87 N.Y.S.2d
362 (3d Dep't 1949) ; see Wood v. Queen City Neon Sign Co., 282 App. Div. 106,
121 N.Y.S.2d 888 (3d Dep't 1953), appeal denied, 306 N.Y. 985, 115 N.E.2d 440
(1953).
6. See American Express Co. v. O'Connor, 279 Fed. 997 (D.C. Cir. 1922)
Hartell v. Simonsen & Son Co., 218 N.Y. 345, 113 N.E. 255 (1916); Benjamin
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 112 N.Y.S.2d 824 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
7. Clement v. Young-McShea Amusement Co., 70 N.J.Eq. 677, 67 Atl. 82
(Err. & App. 1906).
8. Trans America Development Corp. v. Leon, 279 App; Div. 189, 108 N.Y.S.2d
769 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 590, 111 N.E.2d 646 (1953) ; Carlos Land Co.
v. Root, 282 App. Div. 349, 122 N.Y.S.2d 650 (4th Dep't 1953).
9. People's Trust Co. v. O'Neil, 273 N.Y. 312, 7 N.E.2d 244 (1937).
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Notwithstanding the rule that a statute of limitations should be liberally
construed in favor of the injured employee,' 0 it appears that the decision
of the court in the instant case is contrary to the spirit of the law and the
cases interpreting it. There was no showing that the defendant had any
knowledge of the advance payment. The very essence of the advance pay-
ment's tolling the statute of limitations is that these payments must be the
intentional act of the employer. Further there appears to be no rule of
agency which would allow the court to impute the acts of the general em-
ployer to the defendant. The giving of medical treatment by the general
employer would therefore be comparable to advance payments by a mere
volunteer. As in the tolling of the statute of limitations in a contract claim
through part payment, advance payments in a workmen's compensation
litigation should be made by the one to be so bound or his authorized agent.
John C. Voss
10. Colonial Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 277 Cal.2d 437, 164
P.2d 490 (1945).
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